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We use a choice-based subsample ofSocial Security Disability Insurance applicants from
the 1978 Social Security Survey ofDisability and Work to test the importance ofpolicy variables
on thetiming ofapplication fordisability insurance benefits following the onset ofa work limiting
health condition. We correct for choice-based sampling by extending the Manski-Lerman (1977)
correction to the likelihood function of our continuous time hazard model defined with
semiparametric unmeasured heterogeneity and find that this correction significantly affects the
results. We find that economicvariables—the sizeofthe disability benefit, expectedwage earnings
and accommodation—matter.Introduction
Too often disability is seen as a medical problem with a medical solution, but the major
changes in the size and compositionofthe disabilitytransfer population in theUnited States—those
receiving disability transfer benefits from either Social Security Disability Insurance or
Supplemental Security Income—overthe last two decadesmakesit clear that the transition onto the
disability rolls is also influenced by the social environment facedby those with disabilities.
While the road to disability benefit status begins with a health condition, the transition onto
the disabilityrolls can be influencedby thepersonal and economic characteristics ofindividuals, as
well asbythegovernmentpolicies and labormarket conditions theyface. Inthis paperwe recognize
the dynamic nature ofthetransition onto the disability rolls by those whohave a health condition
that affects their ability to workby using a continuous time hazardmodel to measurethe speed at
which such workers apply for disability insurance benefits following the onset of their health
condition.
To estimate ourmodel weuse the 1978 Social Security SurveyofDisability and Work. This
dataset includes a choice-based subsample ofSocial Security Disability Insurance applicants. We
correct for choice-based sampling by extending the Manski-Lerman (1977) correction to the
likelihoodfunction definedwith semiparametric unmeasuredheterogeneity (Butler, Anderson, and
Burkhauser 1989). Ourresults show important effects ofthe correction forchoice-based sampling.
The importance of disability insurance on the decision by workers with serious health
conditions to leavethe laborforce hasbeen in dispute forover a decade. Parsons (1980, 1991), for
instance, argues thatolderworkers withhealth conditions arehighlysensitive to the reward structure
ofthe disabilityinsurance system relativeto labor earnings. Other researchershave foundthat the
expectedreplacement rate ofdisabilityinsurance transfers influences laborsupply but to a much
—1—smaller degree. (See. for instance, Haveman,de Jong, and Wolfe 1991.) Perhaps most damaging
to the view that disability insurance plays an important role in the retirement decision ofhealth
impairedworkers is the finding by Bound (1989) that less than 50 percentofunsuccessful disability
insurance applicants were subsequently employed and that only about two-fifths ofthe 50 percent
worked full-time. (For furtherdiscussion ofthis point, see Bound 1991; Parsons 1991.)
The fact that the majority ofunsuccessful candidates neverreturn to work does not mean,
however, that disability insurance policy does not affect the decisionto leave the labor force and
apply fordisability benefits. Substantial time may elapse betweenthe onset ofa health condition,
its first impact on workperformance, and its subsequent influence onjob exit and application for
disabilitybenefits. Moreover, application for disability insuranceis itselfa risky gamble in which
theultimate outcome canbe delayed formonths or, in some cases, years. Applicants for disability
benefits may “invest” in not being able to work to maximize their chances in what can be a long
drawn out reviewprocess. What Bound hasfound is that, for most workers, the decisionto apply
forbenefits is tantamount to a decisionto withdrawpermanently fromthe labor market. But the size
ofdisabilitybenefits may still be apolicy lever which importantly affectsthe point atwhich health-
impaired workers takethat gamble.
It is important to look at the timing ofthe disability application in order to see not only
whetherworkers ever apply fordisability insurance but also the speed atwhich they do sofollowing
the onsetofa health condition. This dimensionoftheempirical facts uncoveredby Bound suggests
that the disability application process can be describedby a hazardmodel.
Data
The 1978 Survey ofDisability and Work is a nationally representative economically based
dataset containing information on disabled workers. (Fortechnical details, see Bye and Scheckter
-2-1982.) This survey of the prevalence ofwork disabilities in the working age population was
conducted bythe Social Security Administration and contains two sampling frames. The first is a
subsample ofthe Health Interview Survey (HIS) and is representative ofthe general population of
noninstitutionalized persons aged 18 to 64. It contains data on 5,652 persons. Unfortunately,
becauseofficial disability status is a relatively rare event, the actual numberofrespondents in this
population who applied fordisability insurance benefits is small. For this reason, a second frame
wasdeveloped to increase the numberofrespondents who had applied fordisabilitybenefits.This
second frame is drawn from administrative records and consists of4,207 personswho applied for
disability insurance.
Respondents in both frames were asked identical questions, including the identity ofany
health conditions theyhad and whentheir main health condition began. Inour study, the time of
onset is defmed asthe yearwheneither the main health condition beganto bother the respondentor
when the respondentfirst becameaware ofits presence. Additional retrospective information on
labor market activity, including occupation, industry, and household characteristics at the time each
respondent’s health beganto limithis abilityto work, is available. Information regarding application
for disability insuranceis also reported.
These surveydatawere matchedwith Social Security earnings records foreachrespondent.
These datacontainthe yearly earningsofa worker since 1951 and the number ofquarters ofSocial
Security-covered employment since 1938. Combining information from the 1978 Survey of
Disability and Work with Social Security earnings records allows us to trace an individual’s
economic behavior from the time his health condition first starts until the date ofapplication for
disability insurance.
In our empirical model, we analyze the behaviorofthe male working age population, i.e.,
those under age 60 at the survey date and older than age 20 at the onset of their main health
-3-condition. Our sample is furtherconfined to those employed atthe onset oftheir health condition.
Those with missing information on either time ofonset or date ofapplication are excluded.1
As a result of this selection process, our sample consists of 1,430 observations—348
observations from the Health Interview Survey and 1,082 observations from the administrative
sample.
Choice-Based Sampling
Due to the nature of a two-frame sampling approach, special attention must be paid in
selecting the study sample. Since the administrative frame is composed ofdisability insurance
applicants only, application duration can be calculated directlywithoutcensoring. However, using
this sampleto look atduration until application fordisability benefitswould lead to biased results,
since the administrative frame oversampled early applicants. Therefore, the proportions ofour
mixed total samplewill inconsistently estimatethe correspondingpopulation proportions. Manski
and Lerman (1977) show that treatingchoice-based samples as ifthey were random and calculating
estimators appropriate to random samples yield inconsistent estimates. They introduced a weighted
likelihood function that cangenerate consistent estimates.
To obtain consistent estimators, we use the total sample with an estimator corrected for
choice-based sampling. By merging the two frames, a larger and more heterogeneous population
is obtained. Each observation’s contributionto the log likelihood is weighted by P(j)!S(/), where
P(j) is theprobability density ofa person with the characteristics ofpersonj and S(j) is the sample
probability of a person with the characteristics ofpersonj. This is defined based on the sample
design (oversampling or undersampling certain people) and the population ofapplicants. These
weights are available from the 1978 Survey. However, 75 persons, 22 percent of the Health
-4-Interview Survey, appeared in the administrative sample. These respondents are not identified in





where TV5 pr(x population)Ipr(x administrative sample),
= pr(x I population) /pr(x Health Interview Survey)
The first term in equation (1) is the correct total weight forrespondents in both samples, and since
they appear twice in the sample, we subtract their assigned weight, TV~. Because T~cannot be
identifiedinthe administrative survey,we assign themthe meanvalue ofthe administrativeweights.
The Hazard Model
The empirical model adopted hereis a variant ofthe hazard model used by Diamond and
Hausman (1984). Ourhazard rateis the probability ofapplying fordisability insurancefollowing
the onsetofa health condition, conditional on an initial state ofworking. The application decision
is modeled as a singletransition process.
Since information is available on the time ofonset ofa health condition, the measure of
duration does not sufferfrom leftcensoring. However, some spells arecensored on the right. Our
empirical model is estimatedwith a univariate interval hazardmodel. Since the time ofapplication
fordisability insuranceis measured in yearlyintervals, a pointhazard is not appropriate. Wecontrol
forunobserved individualheterogeneity. This heterogeneity mayexistbecauseofomittedvariables,
uncertainty, ordifferences in thedistribution functionacross individuals. Ifthese differences arenot
controlled, then there maybe spurious durationdependence. This unobserved factor is integrated
out ofthe likelihoodfunction by assuming a semiparametric form.2
-5-The form ofour hazardis
h(t) = exp(X’~+ty1 +t2y2 +e)
where t is time,
- .~ (0, 02) or -f( ),
andj( )is estimated as a discrete probabilitymass function definedatpoints chosen from numerical
integrationtheory,with themassestimated. BothHeckman and Singer (1984)and Butler, Anderson,
and Burkhauser (1989) estimatea hazard model with an unspecified distribution ofthe unmeasured
heterogeneity by substituting a discrete distribution. Theformerestimates both thepointsofsupport
and theprobability mass; the latter,which we use here, fixes thepointsofsupport and estimates the
probability mass. The resulting likelihood functioncan be madearbitrarily accuratein principle by
allowing morepoints ofsupport.
Variables Affecting Duration Until Disability Insurance Application
The explanatory variables in our hazard models are defined in Table 1. They include
economic and health status variables as well as control variables.
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA)
To receive disability insurancebenefits a workermust have sufficient quarters ofcoverage
to be eligible for the program, and he or she must be unable to perform any substantial gainful
activity. Applicants must have a physical or mental impairment that has prohibited them from
working for five months and will make it unlikely that they can work for at least one year. If
accepted onto therolls, theworker’s benefitswillbe determinedby programrules relatedto age and
theirSocial Securityearnings history. Based on these factors,a PrimaryInsurance Amount (PTA)
is calculated.
-6-Previous researchers(see, for instance, Leonard 1979; Halpern and Hausman 1986; Bound
1989; Burkhauser, Butler, and Kim 1995) have used individual data on disability insurance
applicants to estimate the expected replacement rate ofall individuals in this sample,that is, their
probability of receiving benefits multiplied by their PIA and divided by their previous wage
earnings. Here we use the value ofthe person’s PTA based on his earning record to the time of
analysis. PIA thenbecomes a time-varying variablein ourhazard model representing the potential
benefit ofdisability insurance benefits. The largerthe benefit, the largershould be the probability
orhazard ofapplication fordisability benefits.
Expected Earnings
We estimated expected earnings, following the style ofmacroeconomics, with a vector
autoregression. To do this wetook advantage ofthe factthat wehave the Social Securityearnings
history ofall respondents in the 1978 Survey. We startedatthe beginning ofeachperson’s earning
record, adjusted for the fact that earnings above the Social Security taxable maximum are not
captured by these data.3 Then we used each personwith at leastfive yearsofearnings to define a
vector autoregressionofearnings at time t, e~, on four lagged values ofearnings, e11, e~2, et.3, and
on a dummy variable,d~ for whetherthepersonhad ahealth condition attime tthat limited his
orher ability to work, and interactions betweenlagged earnings and laggeddummyvariables, d~.1,
d~2, d~,3,andd~4.The numberofobservationsper personvaried according to how long the person
had earnings; a fewpeople had fewer than fiveyears ofearnings and contributed no observations
to theregression.
The resultsofourexpected earningsregressions arereported in Table 2. There were 5,745
person years in the HIS sample and 18,463 personyears in the administrative records sample. In
each case,the autocorrelationpossibly presentwas ignored,because ourobjective was to obtain an
equation to predict wages following the onset ofa health condition that limited work, ratherthana
-7-structural model with theoretically correct standard errors. The variables are all available in the
individual’s information set and produce a very high R2 in both samples. Given the presence of
recent past earnings, it is doubtful that additional variables such as education could contribute any
noticeable additional explanatorypower. The equations are broadly similar, with the largest effect
coming from one-period lagged earnings, but earnings in the administrative records sample are
higher, and the effects ofa health condition are lower forthe intercept and higherforthe slopes in
the administrative records sample. Expected earningsrepresenttheopportunity costofapplying for
disability insurance benefits, and we expect that those with higher expected benefits will have a
lower probability orhazardofapplication forbenefits.
Accommodation
Most economic models of disability insurance application ignore the importance of an
employer’sbehavior on this outcome.4 Yet the willingness ofan employer to adjust the workplace
to compensateforan employee’s work limitationmay play an importantrole in allowing theworker
to continue on his job. This is certainly the beliefofthose who supported the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, which requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations to
disabledworkers as long asthese accommodations do not create an undue hardship onthe operation
ofbusiness. Our data, which predate the passage ofthis act, allow us to estimate the effect of
accommodation on disability insurance application. A variable reports whetheran employer did
anything to accommodatethe workerwhen his health condition first began to affect his abilityto do
his job. Weexpect accommodationto reduce the risk ofapplying fordisabilityinsurance benefits.
Socioeconomic Variables
Ageat Onset, Marital Status at Onset, Race, Education, and Experience are also included in
ourempirical model. Married men, menwith moreeducation and experience,young men, and non-
-8-blacks are generally found to have stronger ties to the labor force and, hence, we expect these
characteristics to delay application.
Job Characteristics
Severalresearchers have lookedattheimportanceofjob attributes on thedecisionofworkers
to retire. We report our results using a binary variable to distinguish white collar workers. In
estimations not shown we used more elaborate job attribute measures developed by Roos and
Treiman(1980) from theDictionary ofOccupational Titles. These measures were usedby the Social
SecurityAdministrationin their 1986 report. We expect that a workerwith a disability is less atrisk
to apply fordisability insurance benefits ifhe is workingon a white collar job.
Health Measures
Finally, we attempt to account for variations with our sample by use of a comorbidity
measure. Because all ofthe respondents in our sample have a health condition that affects their
ability to work, we are not estimating the unconditional impact of health on the speed of
applications. Naturally, those with no health problem are less likely to applyforbenefits. Rather,
we areattempting to account forvariations in health within the population with a health condition.
Specifically, wewant to capture the speed ofapplication following the onset ofsuch a condition.
To see ifdifferent types ofhealth conditions influencethe speed ofapplication, we choose the two
most common physical conditions amongthe disability insurancepopulation, cardiovascular and
musculoskeletal conditions, aswell as a measureofmultiple conditions. We expect that those with
multiple conditions are more likely to apply forDI benefits.
Results
Inaddition to providinga definitionofall variables usedin this analysis, Table 1 also reports
the unweighted and weighted means of the combined sample of 1,430 persons used in our
-9-estimations. Thecorrected means reflectthe Manski-Lerman weights. As will be seen, the weights
makea profound differencein themean characteristicsofthe total samplebecausethe characteristics
ofthe respondents in the two subsamples are quite different. The choice-based disability insurance
applicants are on average older, less educated, and more experienced, and were in worse health at
thetimetheirhealth condition first beganto affect theirworkthantherandom sampleofpeople with
health conditions. The choice-based applicants were also less likely to havebeen accommodated
than the random sample, and they had lower PIA and expected earnings.
Weighting the sample also has a substantial effect on the distribution of spell lengths.
Table 1 also shows average spell length increases in the weighted sample, since our subsample of
applicants oversampled those who applied for benefits afterrelatively short spells with a health
condition. When we weightthe sample, average spell duration increases. This can be seen more
clearlyin Table 3, which shows thedistribution ofspell lengths between onsetofa health condition
and application for benefits. Table 3 reports Kaplan-Meier estimates ofthe length ofspell based on
theunweightedand weighted samples. Inthe unweightedsample, 25.5 percentofthe sampleapply
for benefits in the first year, 63.3 percent afterfive years, and 77.8 percent afterten years. These
probabilities are overstated, because ofthe oversampling ofshort spells in the administrative record
sample. Using the Manski-Lerman corrected sample, we find only 9.5 percent of respondents
applied in the firstyear, 30.2 percent afterfive years, and 40.4 percent afterten years. These results
suggest that weighting the sample may importantly affect the results.
Table 3 traces the speedofapplication unadjustedforheterogeneity. In Table 4 we control
forboth observed and unobserved heterogeneity in ourunweighted and weighted samplesusing a
hazard model with log normal and semiparametricunmeasured heterogeneity. The semiparametric
model is preferred, becauseitimposes less restrictiveassumptions onthe estimation. As canbe seen
in Table 4, however, using the log normal orsemiparametric model makes little difference in the
-10-results. The use ofManski-Lermanweights, however, makes a much greater difference. Several
coefficients reverse sign, and severalcoefficients become significant. Theunweighted estimates are
biased, and are shown here simplyto illustrate that using weights in hazardmodel estimation with
choice-based samplescan make a difference.
In both samples our principal policy variables—PTA, expected earnings, and
accommodation—significantly affect duration until application. A greater PIA, a smaller expected
earnings, orthe absenceofaccommodation will all increase the speed at which men will apply for
disability benefitsfollowing theonset ofa health condition.
Other variables have the following effects. Older age at onset, not being married, being
white, and having less education increase the speed ofapplication. More experience discourages
application for benefits. White collar status is the only insignificant variable in the model. ~
Comorbidity is unexpectedly associated with slower disability insurance application, and a
cardiovascular condition increases the speed of application, while a musculoskeletal condition
decreasesthe speed ofapplication.
Table 5 uses the results from the corrected semiparametricestimation ofthe weighted data
to calculate two intuitively appealing measures ofthe effects ofthe exogenous variables: 1) their
effect on the probabilityofapplying fordisability insurance benefits withintenyears ofthe onset
ofa health condition and 2) their marginal effect on expected duration until application. Both of
theseare nonlinear functionsofthe coefficients, and theirstandarderrors are derivedusing the delta
method. A yearofeducation increases durationuntil application by 0.48 years and decreasesthe
probability of applying for benefits within ten years by 1.6 percentage points. The effect of
accommodation is to postpone application by 5.4 more years and to decrease the probability of
applying forbenefits within the first ten years by 19 percentage points. A $100 monthly increase
in PTA increases the probabilityofapplication in tenyears by 1.8 percent, whilea $100 per month
—11—increase in expected earnings reduces the probability ofapplication by 0.6 percent. The effect ofa
$100 increase in the PIA on theexpected duration is a reduction of0.53 years, and the effect ofa
$100 increase in expectedearnings is an increase of0.19 years. So a dollarofpotential benefit from
disabilityinsurancehas theeffect of$3.00 ofexpectedearnings. Alloftheseeffects aresignificantly
different from zero.
Conclusion
The 1978 Social Security Survey ofDisability and Work containsboth arandom sample of
workerswith health conditions and a choice-based sampleofsuchworkers. While combining these
data provides a larger sample of applicants for disability insurance benefits, the sample is not
representative ofthe populationofall people with health conditions. Inthis paper, a hazardmodel
is estimated to measure the speed at which workers who experience a health condition apply for
disability insurance benefits. In so doing, we apply a Manski-Lerman choice-based sampling
correctionto our semiparametric unmeasured heterogeneity specification ofthe hazard model. We
find that this correction importantly affects our results by altering the estimates and levels of
significance ofthe effects ofseveralexplanatory variables.
The estimates show that increasing the Primary Insurance Amount increases the speed of
application fordisabilityinsurance,while increasing expected earnings and experiencedecreases the
speed ofapplication. A numberofdemographic, economic, and physical factors affect application.
Accommodationby an employer inparticular reduces the speedofapplication, adding asmuchtime
to the worklife as 70 monthsofexperience ora reduction in PTA of$1,000 per month.
-12-Appendix
Estimation of Yearly Labor Earnings for PersonsWhose Wages Exceed
the Social Security Taxable Maximum
The mean ofyearly laborearnings ofpersons whose yearly laborearnings exceed the Social
Security taxablemaximum is calculated in Table A-i. Aconstantflowoflaborearnings is assumed.
Y designates labor earnings; M designates the maximum. The task is to assign a value oflabor
earnings when Y is recordedas M, and the quarterin which M was reached is known.
Inthe first setofcolumns,the Fox (1984)technique is illustrated. When M is reached inthe
fourth quarter,M is assigned; whenM is reachin the first, second, orthird quarter,4M, 2M,or 4M/3
is assigned. This techniqueassumes the maximum is reached at the end ofthe quarter, creating a
bias toward zero.
Inthe second set ofcolumns, log normaldistributions oflaborearnings in thepopulation are
assumed and estimated using the sample ofpersons with labor earnings in that year. Then the
expectedvalue ofthe log normal laborearnings, giventhat it exceedsthe statutory tax maximum in
a given quarter, is calculated. In the fourth quarter, 4M/3 >Y>M. Inthe thirdquarter, 2M> Y>
4M/3. In the second quarter, 4M>Y>2M. Inthe first quarter Y> 4M. These values exceed the
standard Fox technique values,because the truncation is explicitly modeled.
-13-Endnotes
Some respondents made multiple applications forthe program. The questionnaire asked
only thedate ofthe last application. Ifweuse only the first applicant sample, there may
be a selectivity problem. Fortunately, ourinterval hazard estimation technique allows us
to use all applications. The time ofthe first application, which is the one weanalyze,
must be before the last application; thus, an interval from zero to the time ofthe last
application includesthe time ofthe first application.
2. As shown below, we also do the analysisusing a log normal distribution. It doesnot alter
the main findings.
3. In the Social Securityearnings records file, whena person’s labor income exceedsthe
Social Security taxablemaximum in any year, the maximum is recorded along with the
quarterin which the maximum was reached. Those interested in assigning actual
earnings ratherthanmaximum taxableearnings must estimate earnings. The Fox
technique (Fox 1984) uses the maximum scaled according to the quarter,i.e., the
maximum 4M or2M, 4M/3 or M, ifthe limit is reached in the first, second, third, or
fourth quarter. Amore sophisticated approximation method is to assume a distribution of
income and to calculate the expected valueofthe appropriate truncated distribution. We
assume a log normal distribution ofincome. See the Appendix forthe calculations and
values used foreachyearfrom 1951 to 1978.
4. An exception in the economics literature is Baldwin and Johnson (1994), which attempts
to measure the partofthe wage difference betweenthose with and without disabilities
that is causedby discrimination.
5. We foundsimilar results in alternative equationsusing Roos and Treiman’s (1980)
-14-inputed scores to measure the degree ofstrength require on thejob and thejob’s physical
demands. The use ofthese alternative measures also had no effect on the significance of
other variables.
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-17-Table 1. Definitions ofVariables and Mean Values for the Sample
With and Without the Manski-Lerman Weights
Mean Mean
Variables Definitions Unweighted Weighted
Primary Insurance Amount Primary Insurance Amount in the first yearfollowing 2,289.16 2,604.41
(firstyear) onset of a health condition that limits work. (1,338.74) (1,789.58)
Expected Earnings’ Expected yearly earnings in thefirst year following 5,911.37 7,453.93
(firstyear) onsetofa health condition that limits work. (3,526.79) (5,093.82)
Primary Insurance Amountb PrimaryInsuranceAmount in the tenth year following 1,837.42 2,114.43
(tenth year) onset ofa health condition that limits work. (1,248.35) (1,395.39)
Expected Earnings’ Expected yearly earnings in the tenth year following 4,985.31 6,368.66
(tenth year) onset ofa health condition that limits work. (3,564.65) (5,085.70)
Experience Quarters of coverage in all covered employment at 0.75 0.64
(100quarters) timeofonset (0.36) (0.38)
Accommodation Equals I ifat onsetthe employer provided help to 0.26 0.34
respondent to remain on thejob, otherwise 0 (0.44) (0.47)
Age atOnset Age at onset, years. 41.9 38.5
(10.2) (10.7)
Married atOnset Equals 1 ifmarried, otherwise 0. 0.78 0.82
(0.41) (0.39)
Nonwhite Equals 1 ifnonwhite, otherwise0. 0.15 0.14
(0.36) (0.35)
Education Years offormal education. 9,9 10.9
(3.3) (3.3)
White Collar Equals 1 ifthe occupation atonset is professional or 0.17 0.17
managerial, otherwise 0. (0.37) (0.37)
Comorbidity Equals 1 ifthe respondenthad multiple health 0.76 0.66
conditions at onset, otherwise 0. (0.43) (0.47)
Cardiovascular’ Equals 1 ifthe main healthcondition is in the 0.28 0.17
cardiovascular disease group, otherwise 0. (0.45) (0.38)
Musculoskeletal’~ Equals 1 ifthe main health condition is in the 0.33 0.47
musculoskeletal disease group, otherwise 0. (0.47) (0.50)
Length ofSpell Number of years from onsetto application or 5.95 7.18
censoring (6.77) (7.02)
‘Based on estimates in Table 2.
bWhile individual PIAs increase over time, the meanPTA ofthose who have still not applied for benefits falls over time
since those with higherPIAs apply for benefits sooner.
‘Includes heart attack, arteriosclerosis, and other hearttroubles..
dlncludes chronic stiffness inarm, hand, foot, leg, or back; other deformities of the backor spine, muscular atrophy, and
lupus.Table 2. Regressions Used to Estimate Labor Earnings
HIS Sample AdministrafiveRecords Sample
Standard Standard
Variable Coefficient Erro? Coefficient Error*
Constant 686.777 61.016 1,083.482 38.339
Disabled -450.627 96.686 -409.078 71.95 1
Earn-4 0.0933 0.0295 0.1511 0.0180
Eam-3 0.0968 0.0379 -0.0122 0.0216
Earn -2 0.0666 0.0369 -0.0449 0.0221
Earn-i 0.7158 0.0297 0.7730 0.0173
Interactions
Disab1ed*E~4 0.0687 0.0358 0.0246 0.0317
Disab1ed*E~3 -0.0096 0.0449 0.0145 0.0346
Disab1ed*E~2 0.0848 0.0422 0.1107 0.0285
Disab1ed*E~1 -0.0480 0.0318 -0.1832 0.0240
R2 0.9210 0.8883
aS~dard errors are adjusted forheteroscedasticity but not for autocorrelation; these
regressions are used to predictwages andhave no structuralinterpretation.Table 3. Kaplan-Meier Estimates of theTime To Application for Disability Insurance
With and Without the Manski-Lerman Correctiona
Unweighted Sample Weighted Sample
NumberofPersons Probabilities Numberof Persons Probabilities
‘These estimates are based on allocatinghalfofthe number censored ineachyear to the sample available for application in each year. That assumes that
Year — Censored Ap,j~ng In Sample Applying Surviving Censored Applying In Sample Applying Surviving
1 8 363 1,430 0.255 0.745 78.0 132.2 1,430.0 0.095 0.905
21 4 247 1,059 0.235 0.570 161.0 79.6 1,219.8 0.070 0.842
3 20 107 798 0.136 0.493 97.6 38.1 979.2 0.041 0.807
4 12 93 671 0.140 0.424 55.4 71.3 843.5 0.087 0,737
5 14 75 566 0.134 0.367 71.9 35.9 716.8 0.053 0.698
6 11 49 477 0,104 0.329 60.8 23.9 609.0 0.041 0.669
79 4 4 417 0.107 0.294 32.9 10.5 524.3 0.021 0.655
82 3 6 364 0.099 0.265 17.5 10.5 480.9 0.022 0.641
99 2 8 326 0.087 0.242 70.1 21.5 452.9 0.051 0.608
10 92 1 289 0.074 0.224 31.1 6.8 361.3 0.020 0.596
11 42 7 259 0.105 0.200 10.7 9.3 323.4 0.029 0.578
12 4 20 228 0.088 0.183 21.8 4.1 303.4 0.014 0.570
13 3 15 204 0.074 0.169 25.5 5.3 277.5 0.020 0.559
14 7 21 186 0.115 0.150 19.2 22.6 246.7 0.095 0.506
15 5 15 158 0.096 0.135 22.6 5.0 204.9 0.026 0.492
16 3 10 138 0.073 0.125 6.8 3.7 177.3 0,021 0.482
17 4 9 125 0.073 0.116 9.5 1.9 166.8 0.012 0.476
18 3 12 112 0.109 0.104 7.5 5.0 155.4 0.033 0.461
19 3 11 97 0.115 0.092 18.9 3.1 142.9 0.023 0.450
20 5 5 83 0.062 0.086 33.4 2.2 120.9 0.021 0.440
21 4 47 3 0.056 0.081 24.9 0.6 85.3 0.008 0.437
22 09 65 0.138 0.070 2.2 0.8 59.8 0.014 0.431
23 1 75 6 0.126 0.061 2.5 4.0 56.8 0.072 0.400
24 1 5 48 0.105 0.055 2.2 0.8 50.3 0.016 (1.393
25 0 4 42 0.095 0.049 0.0 0.5 47.3 0.011 0.389
Totalb 167 1263 921.7 508.4
censoringis distributeduniformly within a year. Survival means surviving into the nextperiod on the job, i.e., notyet applying for Disability Insurance.
bYears wherethe unweighted sample size is 40 or less are not shown butare included inthe total.Table 4. Time toApply forDisability InsuranceUsing Unweighted and Weighted Samples
andAssuming Log Normal orSemiparametric Unmeasured Heterogeneity
Unweighted Weighted
Log Normal Semi-Parametrk~ Log Normal Semi-Parametrit.~
Standard Standard Standard Standard
ExplanatoryVariables Coefficient Error Coefficient Error Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
Constant -0.35 0.36 0.04 0.35 0.06 0.25 -0.63 0.45
Age ofonset 0.33 0.08 0.32 0.08 0.38 0.06 0.75 0,08
Marriedatonset -0.12 0.11 -0.10 0.10 -0.49 0.13 -0.85 0.16
Nonwhite 0.20 0.13 0.14 0.12 -0.27 0.11 -0.49 (1.17
Education(tenyears) -0.57 0.16 -0.49 0.14 -0.68 0.11 -0.51 0.14
Accommodation -0.65 0.12 -0.47 0.10 -0.44 0.08 -0.62 0.10
Experience (100 months) -0.66 0.24 -0.48 0.22 -0.10 0.14 -0.91 0.22
White collar 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.12 -0.09 0.10 -0,20 0.12
Comorbidity 0.18 0.10 0.16 0.10 -0.14 0.07 -0.37 0.1(1
Cardiovascular 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.28 0.09 0.36 (1.13
Musculoskeletal -0.45 0.11 -0.37 0.10 -0.96 0.11 -1.41 0.12
PIA (annual; $1,000) 1.12 0.06 1.09 0.06 0.52 0.05 0.60 0.05
Expected earnings (annual; $1,000) -0.22 0.02 -0.21 0.02 -0,17 0.02 -0.21 0,02
Time -1.21 0.25 -1.29 0.23 -2.41 0.31 -1.63 0.27
Time squared 0.37 0.09 0.37 0.08 0.79 0.11 0.65 0.11
Variance ofthe Unmeasured 0.93 0.21 1.33 0.56
Heterogeneity
8Adiscrete distribution of the unmeasuredheterogeneity is also estimated as a partofthis model. This is basedon four possible points, -2.33 (probability
0.15uncorrected, 0.18 corrected), 0.74 (probability 0.00 and 0.39),0.74 (probability 0.75 and 0.00), and 2.33 (probability 0.10 and 0.43). (See Butler,
Anderson, andBurkhauser 1989).Table S. Marginal Effects ofVariables in theWeighted Sample Hazard Model
on Time Until Application for Disability Insurancea
Probability Expected Duration
Standard Standard
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
Age of onset 0.23 0.08 -6.59 2.34
Married atonset -0.26 0.10 7.44 2.94
Nonwhite -0.15 0.07 4.27 1.89
Education (ten years) -0.16 0.06 4.48 1.79
Accommodation -0.19 0.07 5.40 1.89
Experience(l00rnonths) -0,27 0.11 8.03 3.25
White collar -0.06 0.04 1.73 1.27
Comorbidity -0.11 0.05 -3.12 1.41
Cardiovascular 0.11 0.05 -3.12 1.41
Musculoskeletal -0.43 0.15 12.28 4.34
PIA(annual; $1,000) 0.18 0.06 -5.28 1.87
Expectedearnings (annual; $1,000) -0.06 0.02 1.85 0.68
‘These calculations are based on the semiparametric estimatorusingthe weighteddata set (i.e., using the
Manski-Lermancorrection). The expected durationis 16.8 years, and 31.7 percentof the distribution is
estimated not to apply in30 years.Appendix Table A-i. PredictedLabor Earnings ofPersons with
Truncated Social Security Records
HIS Sample
Adjusting theMaximum Alone Mean of the Truncated Log Normal
Year 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1951 14400 7200 4800 3600 21337 9634 5812 4144
1952 14400 7200 4800 3600 26455 9913 5856 4156
1953 14400 7200 4800 3600 28773 10015 5876 4163
1954 14400 7200 4800 3600 30074 10030 5876 4162
1955 16800 8400 5600 4200 25809 11364 6808 4844
1956 16800 8400 5600 4200 26774 11455 6826 4850
1957 16800 8400 5600 4200 32222 11655 6852 4856
1958 16800 8400 5600 4200 32783 11664 6852 4856
1959 19200 9600 6400 4800 28552 12919 7772 5535
1960 19200 9600 6400 4800 31241 13092 7795 5540
1961 19200 9600 6400 4800 30522 13059 7792 5539
1962 19200 9600 6400 4800 41224 13402 7840 5551
1963 19200 9600 6400 4800 51973 13533 7858 5556
1964 19200 9600 6400 4800 47074 13516 7860 5558
1965 19200 9600 6400 4800 46126 13504 7858 5557
1966 26400 13200 8800 6600 43871 18052 10727 7620
1967 26400 13200 8800 6600 44467 18107 10739 7624
1968 31200 15600 10400 7800 45767 20929 12618 8990
1969 31200 15600 10400 7800 55547 21512 12706 9013
1970 31200 15600 10400 7800 49288 21225 12667 9004
1971 31200 15600 10400 7800 64290 21722 12731 9018
1972 36000 18000 12000 9000 74218 25049 14686 10404
1973 43200 21600 14400 10800 72668 29517 17539 12461
1974 52800 26400 17600 13200 73347 34803 21228 15171
1975 56400 28200 18800 14100 83553 37670 22743 16220
1976 61200 30600 20400 15300 90150 40923 24702 17612
1977 66000 33000 22000 16500 100781 44342 26658 18994
1978 69200 34600 23067 17300 101875 46267 27931 19914Appendix Table A-i. Continued
Administrative Records Sample
Adjusting the MaximumAlone Meanofthe Truncated Log Normal
Year_____ 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1951 14400 7200 4800 3600 23901 9811 5840 4152
1952 14400 7200 4800 3600 24801 9873 5853 4156
1953 14400 7200 4800 3600 27112 9977 5871 4162
1954 14400 7200 4800 3600 34284 10093 5885 4164
1955 16800 8400 5600 4200 30147 11572 6837 4851
1956 16800 8400 5600 4200 30604 11608 6845 4854
1957 16800 8400 5600 4200 31052 11639 6852 4857
1958 16800 8400 5600 4200 33767 11688 6855 4857
1959 19200 9600 6400 4800 32354 13166 7809 5544
1960 19200 9600 6400 4800 36053 13294 7826 5548
1961 19200 9600 6400 4800 37772 13334 7831 5549
1962 19200 9600 6400 4800 41753 13425 7845 5553
1963 19200 9600 6400 4800 42763 13448 7849 5555
1964 19200 9600 6400 4800 39873 13427 7850 5556
1965 19200 9600 6400 4800 40779 13455 7856 5558
1966 26400 13200 8800 6600 39798 17854 10708 7618
1967 26400 13200 8800 6600 38222 17738 10696 7617
1968 31200 15600 10400 7800 42797 20662 12592 8989
1969 31200 15600 10400 7800 45098 20948 12637 9000
1970 31200 15600 10400 7800 50612 21330 12686 9010
1971 31200 15600 10400 7800 55476 21558 12720 9019
1972 36000 18000 12000 9000 55595 24411 14605 10387
1973 43200 21600 14400 10800 68875 29297 17503 12451
1974 52800 26400 17600 13200 77651 35162 21266 15175
1975 56400 28200 18800 14100 80391 37174 22630 16178
1976 61200 30600 20400 15300 92667 40620 24568 17547
1977 66000 33000 22000 16500 112920 44424 26582 18944
1978 69200 34600 23067 17300 126153 47045 27971 19900